Recent evidence suggests that the fastest algorithmic traders in financial markets profit at the expense of slower traders. One solution gaining traction is a 'speed-bump', which introduces a delay between the time in which an order is submitted, and when it is processed. We conduct an impact evaluation of the speed bump's effectiveness on Betfair, a betting exchange, where this design has been in force for more than a decade. We find that increases in the duration of the delay led to improvements in liquidity (measured by bid-ask spreads and depth) and market quality (measured by order frequency and volume).
Introduction
Financial market traders compete over differences in the speed of their trading. These differences are measured in milliseconds, microseconds, and even nanoseconds. The fastest algorithmic, high-frequency traders (HFTs) obtain, process, and trade upon financial news before others -often using automated trading strategies themselves -have had a chance to react and update their quotes. Baron et al. (2014) find that the fastest HFTs trading the Emini S&P 500 futures contract are consistently the most profitable. Moreover, these traders make approximately 45% of their profits from adversely-selecting slightly slower liquidityproviding HFTs. As shown by the model of Biais et al. (2014) , the rents available to fast traders lead to over-investment in speed-enhancing technologies. The most famous example of this over-investment is the high-speed fibre-optic cable -built by Spread Networks in 2010 at a cost of $300m -which shaved just 1.4 milliseconds off the time of round-trip communication between Chicago and New York. The competitive advantage from using this new cable was brief, as microwave towers brought the time of round-trip communication down by a further 4.1 milliseconds in 2012. New York, dubbed the Hibernia Express, will be in service from summer 2015. For more details on these constant). In each subsequent season, the proportion of matches subject to a longer delay of 8 or 9 seconds was steadily increased until 91% of matches had order processing delays of 8 or 9 seconds in 2012/13. With a longer delay, the scope for pitch-siders to bet on goals that have already occurred reduces. (Pitch-siders would need to be aware of a goal at least 8 or 9 seconds quicker than their counterparty, as opposed to only 5 seconds quicker with the shorter delay). Therefore, if the speed bump is an effective tool, we would expect that market liquidity would improve each season as the proportion of matches with longer delays increases. Importantly, we can observe liquidity prior to matches, when there is no adverse selection from pitch-siders, and no speed bump delay. This allows us to control for any time-trends in overall liquidity on the exchange over the five seasons.
We find that increases in the average order processing delay led to an improvement in a range of market liquidity and quality measures. Over the five seasons, inplay quoted spreads dropped by 7.3%, effective spreads fell by 3.8%, and inplay quoted depth at the best three prices (on both sides of the book) increased by 19%. Perhaps more striking, we find that the number and size of inplay orders (our primary measures of market quality) increased season-by-season. The frequency of inplay orders increased by 87%, and inplay order volumes increased by 35%. In short, we find that all of our measures of market liquidity and quality improved as the order processing delay was increased. It would appear that increases in the delay protected the majority of bettors from being picked off by pitch-side bettors, and in turn trading costs decreased, and volumes increased.
While our main analysis accounts for time-trends in liquidity on the exchange using prematch liquidity as a benchmark (in a difference-in-difference setting), it is possible that we could be confounding the effect of the speed bump with general increases in interest in inplay betting. To allay such concerns, we runs a series of placebo tests using Wimbledon tennis betting data from the same exchange. Unlike with soccer matches, Betfair kept the inplay tennis delay to 5 seconds throughout the same period. If we are confounding the effect of the soccer speed bump with a steady increase in inplay betting popularity, we would then expect to see similar improvements in tennis inplay market liquidity over the same period.
Yet, we find no significant improvements in spreads or depth for tennis betting. Only inplay trading volumes increased over the same period, but there was no contemporaneous increase in the frequency of orders. We therefore conclude that the improvements in market liquidity and quality that we observe in soccer inplay betting are, in the main, due to increases in the order processing delay.
This paper contributes to a nascent literature on market designs to mitigate the speed advantages of the fastest HFTs. Budish et al. (2013 Budish et al. ( , 2014 propose the use of frequent batch auctions conducted at one second intervals. Traders would submit limit orders as beforespecifying the price and volume at which they wish to trade. Every second, these orders would be aggregated by the exchange, demand and supply schedules would be drawn, and market clearing prices and quantities would be determined. Any orders not fulfilled in a batch auction -if the trader bid less, or asked more, than the clearing price -would be sent to the next batch auction, one second later, to try again. Importantly, within each batch auction, no priority would be given to the time at which the order was submitted.
An alternative solution, suggested by Gai et al. (2013) , is to de-regulate the minimum tick size in financial markets. These authors show that HFT participation is greater in stocks where the minimum tick size is binding (i.e. where spreads cannot get smaller). Furthermore, they find that HFT activity is associated with higher levels of quote cancellations, more short-term price volatility, and little depth (quoted volume) at the best price. They propose further reductions in the minimum tick size to allow liquidity-providing HFTs to compete, once again, on price rather than speed.
In this paper we investigate an alternative solution to the problem of speed advantages in asset markets. Uniquely amongst the solutions offered, the speed bump has been at work on an exchange for more than a decade. This allows us to carry out a detailed evaluation study -using quasi-experimental methods -of its effect on market liquidity and quality.
Furthermore, the speed bump appears to be an appealing solution to financial exchange operators, given than IEX and TSX Alpha implemented such a design feature without a known impact evaluation of its effectiveness.
This brings us to the external validity of our results. Many of the same features found in financial markets can be found in this betting market. Trade takes place on a open limit order book, the most common form of financial exchange (Parlour and Seppi (2008) ), and bettors can execute trades manually or algorithmically through the Betfair Application (lay) positions, and the option of limit or market orders. The development of this exchange -and its now defunct competitor Flutter -represented a departure from the bookmaker dominated system in the U.K.. On the exchanges, bettors could provide liquidity themselves, and more easily take short positions.
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An illustration of the website view of the Betfair limit order book can be found in the top panel of Figure 1 . The screenshot is taken from the match between Crystal Palace and Manchester City on the 6th April 2015 (a match outside of our sample). Odds are displayed with associated depth underneath. Back odds on the left-hand-side allow a punter to bet on a team, and lay odds on the right-hand-side allow for betting against a team. A back quote of 7, for example, offers a punter 6 GBP (plus the return of their stake) for each 1 GBP that they place on that outcome. A lay quote of 7.2 -on the other side of the book -requests a payout of 6.2 plus the stake. Punters can choose to trade at current quotes (with a market order), or provide quotes themselves (with a limit order). The screenshot shows the limit orders in the book at the time.
While Betfair originally facilitated only pre-event sports betting, the development of inplay betting was also pioneered on the exchange. Here, punters could wager on an event as it unfolded. The inception of this type of betting was accompanied by a new form of adverse selection. Due to inevitable delays in television broadcasts, punters present at a sporting event had a fleeting informational advantage. Those present could be aware of a goal in soccer, the outcome of a point in tennis, or a fall in a horse race, a few seconds before those watching the action at home.
The presence of such court-siders, as they were dubbed in tennis, or pitch-siders, as they were dubbed in soccer, received a great deal of media attention in January 2014, when a court-sider was arrested at the Australian Open tennis championships in Melbourne.
3 This individual was inputting scores into his phone, which would then be fed into an algorithmic 2 Prior to the development of exchanges, a punter looking to bet with a bookmaker against a given horse, for example, would have to bet on all other competitors in the race. trading strategy implemented on Betfair. By consistently being a point ahead of other bettors watching the action at home in the U.K., courtsiders could expect to profit from hundreds of fleeting informational advantages.
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The advantage available to pitch-siders or court-siders depends on the lag in television broadcasts. The length of broadcast delays depend on the technology used both by the broadcaster and the viewer. Kooij (2014) conducted a study of broadcast delays, with the aim of facilitating the synchronisation of different broadcasts for interactive programmes.
He estimates that the minimum delay from filming to receiving a broadcast is 4 seconds.
This delay increases by approximately 2 seconds if the broadcast is via satellite (rather than terrestrial), increases further for high-definition transmissions, and an additional delay is incorporated if the transmission must be passed between foreign and domestic broadcasters.
Even longer lags are found in internet streams.
In order to counter the type of adverse selection that arises due to broadcast delays, Betfair have implemented a speed bump, or order processing delay, since the inception of inplay trading. The duration of the order processing delay does, however, vary significantly across sports. Horse racing is subject to a delay of just 1 second, which is clearly insufficient to protect bettors at home. This perhaps explains why Brown and Yang (2014) found that speculative trade, by market order traders, was highly predictive of fundamentals during races. For tennis the delay is 5 seconds. The presence of court-siders at the Australian Open suggests that this is insufficient, at least for that particular broadcast. Finally, soccer is subject to a delay of 5-9 seconds, with higher delays in more recent seasons. The calculations of Kooij (2014) suggest that that delays at the upper end (8 or 9 seconds) may, just, be enough to eradicate a pitch-sider's advantage.
The speed bump is illustrated in the bottom panel of Figure 1 . The screenshot is taken from the same match as earlier, but this time a bet has been placed. The ticker in the top-left hand corner illustrates how much of the order processing delay is still left to run (in this case 1 second). Once that 1 second is up, the order will be logged in the book, and execute with 4 Although the individual was arrested under suspicion of harming tennis's integrity, the practice of courtsiding has little to do with match-fixing or corruption. Court-siding likely has effects only on the equity, and liquidity, of associated betting markets.
a limit order if such a limit order has not been cancelled.
In this study we use the steady increases in the order processing delay for soccer matches, season by season, as our 'treatment'. We then compare the drift in liquidity and market quality over the seasons for inplay bets -subject to pitch-siding and increases in the order processing delay -with any drift that might be observed in pre-match trading, where there is neither this type of adverse selection, nor a speed bump in operation. To ensure that we are not confounding the effect of increases in the order processing delay with changes in the interest in inplay trading, we also run a series of placebo tests using Wimbledon tennis data.
Over the same number of years, Betfair kept the tennis order processing delay fixed at 5 seconds.
Why did Betfair raise the order processing delay for soccer betting, but not for tennis betting? Unfortunately, we can only speculate about the reasons. Certain articles written around the time of the arrest of the court-sider in Melbourne emphasised that the firm behind the court-sider was run by former Betfair employees. 5 A second, perhaps related, point is that just as financial exchanges are conflicted in their attitudes to the most predatory high-frequency traders -they generate order flow (and commissions), but are likely to reduce liquidity -betting exchanges undoubtedly face the same dilemma. A third possible explanation is that pitch-siding in soccer creates more obvious losers. If a bettor has their quotes picked-off by a pitch-sider who knew that a goal has already been scored, the unfortunate bettor will undoubtedly know, afterwards, that they had been at an informational disadvantage. On the other hand, a bettor who is continually one point behind the court-sider may be oblivious to this fact, as one point has less impact on the price than a goal. This factor may, or may not, explain Betfair's willingness to lengthen the order processing delay for soccer bets, but not for tennis bets.
Before we proceed, it is worth explaining why we do not use variation, within season, in the assignment of short and long order processing delays. Why, for example, do we not compare a match in 2009/10 which was subject to a 5 second delay, with a match in the same season with a 8 second delay? The reason is that the assignment of the length of order processing delay is non-random within seasons. Matches played at 3pm on a Saturday -and therefore not legally televised -are disproportionately more likely to be assigned an 8 or 9
second order processing delay compared to televised matches played at other times. We will illustrate this point in more detail in the next section. It is the case, however, that -for both Saturday 3pm matches and televised matches played at other times -the probability of being 'treated' with a longer order processing delay increases each season. In other words, a match with any given set of characteristics has an increased chance of getting a longer order processing delay in a later season than in an earlier season.
Data
We collected data on English Premier League soccer betting, on Betfair, for the seasons 2008/9 through to 2012/13. This data was acquired from Fracsoft, a third-party provider of
Betfair data. The Fracsoft data includes second-by-second snapshots of the limit order book, from the morning of each match, through to its conclusion. Incomplete data was available for the 2006/7 and 2007/8 seasons, but this largely related to the marquee televised games -which undoubtedly receive more attention and volume -and therefore due to selection concerns we left these seasons out of our analysis. The five seasons worth of data that we use relate to 5,211 separate bets, which, as each match has 3 bets (win/lose/draw), means that we have data, on average, on 347 out of a possible 380 matches a season. This yields more than 108 million observations of the Betfair limit order book.
For our placebo tests we collected six years of Betfair betting data on the Men's Wimbledon Tennis Championships from 2008 to 2013 inclusive. This data comes from the same source (Fracsoft) as the soccer data and comes in the same form. As with our main data, the limit order book is sampled from the morning of each match until its conclusion. There are potentially 768 matches (128 per year) for the six years of the Championships we study.
However, there are withdrawals, byes and missing data, and therefore we have data on 641 separate matches. This yields approximately 35.4 million observations of the Betfair limit order book.
Our first comments concern the duration of the order processing delay. As shown in Table 1 , the average inplay order processing delay, for our main soccer data, increased each season from 2008/9 to 2012/13. In the first season the average delay was 6.3 seconds, and in the last season the delay was 7.65 seconds. The smallest increase in the average delay was between 2008/9 and 2009/10, when the delay increased by 21 milliseconds. As described in the Introduction, the delay within each match is fixed, which means that the number of matches with longer delays of 8 or 9 seconds increases season-by-season. In contrast, the inplay delay for Wimbledon tennis betting stayed constant at 5 seconds throughout the sample period. For both soccer and tennis, the order processing delay was 0 seconds prior to the start of play.
We also summarise the information related to the main soccer data in Figure 2 . In the left panel we display the pre-match data, with the inplay data in the right panel. Anticipating some of our later analysis, we also break the sample down into Saturday 3pm matches, and non-Saturday 3pm matches. The former cannot be legally televised (but can often be watched using illegal internet streams), and the majority of the latter are legally broadcast on satellite television. As illustrated in this figure, Saturday 3pm matches have higher average delays than the televised matches. For both types of matches, however -both televised and non-televised -the average inplay order processing delay broadly increases season-by-season.
We are interested, firstly, in the effect of changes in the order processing delay on market liquidity. For this purpose, we use the following four measures of liquidity:
• Quotes: an indicator variable equalling 1 if there are, in that second, quoted prices on both sides of the book (bid and ask/back and lay).
An extreme indication of adverse selection would be the absence of any liquidity provision at all. In the Glosten and Milgrom (1985) model, liquidity would disappear in such a manner if all market order traders were informed (about the outcome of the match, and the fundamental value of the bets).
• Quoted spread: defined, in implied win probability terms, as (1/B − 1/L) * 100, where B are the best back odds, and L are the best lay odds.
Odds quoted on Betfair include the stake, and therefore odds of 3, will return 2 GBP plus the 1 GBP stake in the case of a win. Therefore, suppose back odds are 4, and lay odds are 5. This would result in a (very large) spread of (1/4 − 1/5) * 100 = 5. More generally, a widening of the quoted spread indicates greater adverse selection (see Glosten and Milgrom (1985) again).
• Effective spread: defined, in implied win probability terms, as 100 * 2 * abs(1/M t − (1/B t−1 + 1/L t−1 )/2), where B are the best back odds, L are the best lay odds, M is the last transaction price (in odds), and abs(.) is the absolute difference.
The effective spread takes the absolute difference between the last transaction price, and the midpoint of the bid-ask spread in the previous second. The term is multiplied by 2 to make it equivalent to the quoted spread, otherwise it would be a half spread. The effective spread captures the costs that traders actually pay to trade. On the one hand, the effective spread may be smaller than the quoted spread, as traders are more likely to trade when quoted spreads are smaller. On the other hand, there are instances when effective spreads can be larger than quoted spreads. Trades of a large size may not be solely executed at the best quotes, and will need to walk down the book to the 2nd best quotes, the 3rd best quotes, and so on. Effective spread therefore captures this fact, and incorporates both the quoted spread, and to a certain extent, the quoted depth.
• Depth: defined as the sum of the volumes associated with the best three quotes, on both the back and lay side of the book.
Liquidity providers can also adjust the volume they are willing to trade in the presence of informed traders (see Dupont (2000)). In the presence of adverse selection, we would expect to see lower depth quoted at the best prices.
The aim of the speed bump is that it reduces the adverse selection problem for liquidity providers. If the informed's informational advantage is fleeting, then it should have disappeared by the time they are able to cross the speed bump and execute their trades. However, while the speed bump may lessen adverse selection, it could have negative consequences for the overall quality of asset markets. For example, such a market design may make it more difficult to execute trades, particularly of a significant size (as liquidity providers will have cancelled their quotes before the order is logged on the exchange).
Adverse Selection, Speed Bumps and Asset Market Quality
With this in mind, we are also interested in the following two measures of asset market quality:
• Order: an indicator variable equalling 1 if there was an order in the last second.
The Fracsoft data includes information on the total matched volume each second, for each bet. Therefore any increase in this indicates that a market order has been executed. If the speed bump is detrimental to trade, this measure should decline, inplay, over the seasons.
• Volume: the size of the order, in GBP, conditional on there being an order.
This information can also be calculated from the total matched volume measure provided by Fracsoft. If the speed bump is detrimental to trade, we might expect this measure to decline, inplay, season-by-season. Summary statistics on the four liquidity measures and the two market quality measures can be found in Table 2 .
Analysis
For the initial part of our analysis, we estimate an equation of the following form:
Outcome it is one of our market liquidity or quality measures, Season it is the number of the season running from 2008/9 (number 1) to 2012/13 (number 5), Inplay it is an indicator equalling 1 if the match in question has begun, Season it Inplay it is an interaction between the two, and e it is an error term. i is a subscript to indicate the bet in question (e.g. Manchester
United to beat Arsenal on the 3rd of October at Old Trafford), and t is a subscript to indicate the particular second that the bet prices are sampled (i.e. 3rd October 16.21.03 pm).
The idea behind this difference-in-difference specification is as follows. The Season it will capture general drifts in the Outcome it over time. The Inplay it indicator will capture the declines in liquidity, and increases in orders, that occur as a match begins. Our key variable of interest is the interaction term, Season it Inplay it , which will capture the specific change in the Outcome it , inplay, over time, as the average order processing delay increases.
ostensibly liquid markets, if no-one actually gets to trade.
With this in mind, in Table 3 and Figures 7 and 8 , we examine the effect of increases in the order processing delay on the frequency of executed-orders and the size of these orders. As illustrated quite clearly in Figure 6 , the frequency of inplay orders increases at a faster rate, over the seasons, than the frequency of pre-match orders. Inplay order frequency almost doubled from 2008/9 to 2012/13. Similarly, the average volume of each of these orders increased. Against a backdrop of declining order size in pre-match markets, the size of inplay orders increased by 35% from 2008/9 to 2012/13. It would appear that rather than prohibiting the execution of trade, the increases in the speed bump delay encouraged more, and larger, bets.
Perhaps the strongest concern with our analysis thus far, is that we may be confounding the effect of the speed bump with changes in the popularity of inplay betting. The argument may go that pre-match betting interest was static or declining, but inplay betting had a surge in popularity which led to greater liquidity, more orders and larger volumes. Our approach to this concern is to replicate our analysis with an analysis of Wimbledon tennis betting on Betfair. If inplay betting popularity surged relative to pre-match betting, we should observe a similar effect in this sport. (Of course, we cannot rule out the possibility that there was a football-specific surge in inplay betting popularity, but we have no reason to believe that there was). Importantly, Betfair kept the inplay order processing delay for tennis fixed at 5 seconds throughout the same period.
In Table 4 we display the results of our placebo tests on Wimbledon betting data. Season is replaced by Year -which runs from 2008 (number 1) to 2013 (number 6) -but otherwise the regressions are identical. In terms of our four liquidity measures, we find a slight decline in the probability of quotes (our coarsest measure of liquidity) and no significant effect on our three other measures. In other words, there is nothing to suggest that there were similar improvements in inplay liquidity in the tennis betting market. In terms of market quality, we do find that the volume of inplay tennis orders increased significantly. However, this is not accompanied by an increase in the frequency of orders, as it was for the soccer data. In short, our placebo tests lead us to believe that the improvements in inplay soccer liquidity, and to a lesser extent market quality, were not due to general increases in inplay betting interest, but instead were due to increases in the order processing delay.
In our final piece of analysis, we return to the main soccer data. There is reason to believe that there may be differences between matches that are televised, and those that are not. In the U.K., it is illegal to broadcast Saturday 3pm matches. The rationale is that this will harm attendances for lower league matches. Therefore, to watch these Saturday 3pm matches, punters would either need to use an illegal satellite dish (to watch the broadcast of another country), or follow a foreign broadcast on the internet. As discussed in Section 2, internet streams tend to have the longest delays. The specific lag, of course, depends on the foreign broadcaster and the internet technology. It is possible, however, that the protection afforded to bettors from the speed bump is more important for these Saturday 3pm matches, as they are either not watching the match, or are watching it many seconds behind the pitch-sider.
It is with this idea in mind, that we proceed to our analysis in Table 5 . We regressed our six outcomes variables on the three variables from Table 3 , but this time added an indicator for Saturday 3pm matches, and every possible combination of interactions between the Saturday 3pm indicator, the Season, and the Inplay indicator. Markets on Saturday 3pm matches tend to be less liquid and attract less orders, particularly inplay (due to the difficulties in television access). Our key variables of interest, however, are the Season-Inplay indicator from before, and the Saturday 3pm-Season-Inplay indicator added to these latest specifications. The former informs us of whether there was a baseline effect on televised matches from increases in the order processing delay, and the latter tells us whether any such effect was larger or smaller for Saturday 3pm matches.
Our results are as follows. We find that the probability of finding quotes was improved by the greater speed bump (with no differences across televised/non-televised matches), and quoted and effective spreads improved, particularly for Saturday 3pm matches. If we consider spreads to be our preferred measure of the cost of trading, our results suggest that the effect of increases in the speed bump delay was concentrated in matches where punters either did not watch the match, or were at the greatest disadvantage relative to pitch-siders. This, in our view, supports the case for the effectiveness of the speed bump. Having said that, lower trading costs do not necessarily go hand-in-hand with greater market quality. Depths, order Spread is defined in Section 3, Depth is the available volume quoted at the best 3 back and lay prices, Order is an indicator variable equalling 1 if an order was executed in that second, and Volume is the trade size per second conditional on an order. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the bet-level, and ***, **, * and . indicates significance at the 0.1%, 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. outcome variables on the year (1-6) that the match took place, an inplay indicator, and an interaction between the year and the inplay indicator. The interaction term captures the 'treatment' effect of increases in the order processing delay from year to year. The 6 outcomes variables are as follows. Quotes is an indicator variable equalling 1 if there are quotes to both back and lay a bet in that second, Quoted Spread is defined in Section 3, Effective Spread is defined in Section 3, Depth is the available volume quoted at the best 3 back and lay prices, Order is an indicator variable equalling 1 if an order was executed in that second, and
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Volume is the trade size per second conditional on an order. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the bet-level, and ***, **, * and . indicates significance at the 0.1%, 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. and an interaction between the Saturday 3pm indicator, the season and the inplay indicator. The interaction term between the season and the inplay indicator captures the 'treatment' effect of increases in the order processing delay from season to season, and the final interaction captures differences in this effect across Saturday 3pm matches (not televised) and non-Saturday 3pm matches (most matches televised). The 6 outcomes variables are as follows. Quotes is an indicator variable equalling 1 if there are quotes to both back and lay a bet in that second, Quoted Spread is defined in Section 3, Effective Spread is defined in Section 3, Depth is the available volume quoted at the best 3 back and lay prices, Order is an indicator variable equalling 1 if an order was executed in that second, and Volume is the trade size per second conditional on an order. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the bet-level, and ***, **, * and . indicates significance at the 0.1%, 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
